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This study analyses the system of Spanish publicly-subsidised private schools from the 
perspective of its contribution to the equalisation of opportunities in school choice. The 
theoretical framework is based on the contributions of researchers into school choice 
policies, while the empirical application uses a 2005 questionnaire answered by the final-
year secondary school students of the Spanish region of Aragon. We conclude that the 
system of Spanish publicly-subsidised private schools has not entirely facilitated the 
integration of students from different socioeconomic strata. A probit model is estimated 
in the last section in order to discover which factors determine the choice of a publicly-
subsidised private school. It is found that the higher the socioeconomic status, the higher 
the probability of choosing such schools, suggesting that the segregation found in this 
paper may be caused partly by the choice patterns of Spanish families. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the principal traits defining the pre-university level Spanish education system 
is its mixed or dual character i.e. a network that is mainly public with a substantial 
private sector. Within the latter, an important position is occupied by publicly-
subsidised private schools, owned by physical or legal persons but funded by 
taxpayers, via the Regional Educational Authorities, through a system of agreements 
regulated by the 1985 Right to Education Act (LODE, in its Spanish initials)1. 
The Spanish publicly-subsidised private schools system is based on an 
administrative model which establishes the reciprocal rights and obligations of the 
owner of the private establishment and the Local Education Authority with regard to 
the economic system, duration, extension and termination of the agreement and other 
conditions for the provision of education2.  
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Formally, Spanish publicly-subsidised private schools may be viewed as an 
instrument which extends freedom of school choice to all social strata. It is true that 
the existence of such schools theoretically broadens the freedom of choice of less 
well-off families, offering them a far wider choice than would have been available to 
them in the absence of this form of public intervention. In this sense, Spanish 
publicly-subsidised private schools can be seen as a mechanism which equalises 
opportunities in school-choice which, in theory, may potentially contribute to the 
homogenisation of the social composition of pupils in schools as a whole and, 
thereby, reduce the educational segregation associated with systems in which the 
private sector is not financed by the public authorities.  
These potential benefits of the system of educational agreements are, 
nevertheless, not automatic because the legal right to choice does not in itself 
guarantee the exercise of this right in practice. The process of choosing a school 
involves significant economic and information barriers which particularly affect 
families of lower socioeconomic status. The costs of obtaining adequate information 
about the schools available must be emphasised, and it should be remembered that 
free enrolment does not mean that all the expenses derived from attending a publicly-
subsidised private school are covered. 
This paper is devoted to answer the following questions. Does school 
segregation exist in the Spanish Educational System? In other words, does the school 
choice educational policy in Spain favour a mixture of pupils from different 
socioeconomic and academic levels? How do the public and the publicly-subsidised 
private Spanish education sectors compare with regard to the segregation occurring 
among the different schools within each sector? Which factors explain the choice of 
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educational centre and, therefore, the distribution of pupil types between public and 
publicly-subsidised private schools?  
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the principal 
theoretical and empirical contributions on the foreseeable effects of school choice 
policies in the field of efficiency and equity. Section 3 compares the academic and 
socioeconomic profiles of students in public and publicly-subsidised private 
secondary schools in the Spanish region of Aragon. Section 4 compares the social 
stratification which exists in public and publicly-subsidised private schools by 
calculating various indices of socioeconomic segregation. Section 5 proposes a model 
of school choice which permits the identification of the factors which condition the 
choice of educational centre and, consequently, the distribution of pupils between 
public and publicly-subsidised private schools. The final section presents the principal 
conclusions of the study. 
2. School choice: effects upon the efficiency and equity of the school system 
 
The debate over school choice stems from the proposal of Milton Friedman to 
establish a voucher system which would allow all families, regardless of their income 
level, to freely choose their children's educational centre, whether public or private 
(Friedman 1955). Since then, many studies have analysed the effects of school choice 
policies. The debate has principally been focused on conceptual arguments rather than 
on empirical research. A comprehensive book edited by Hoxby (2003), investigating 
the ways in which school choice affects a wide range of issues, tries to fill this gap. 
Those who defend the various instruments which permit advances in freedom 
of school choice (vouchers, open enrolment, charter schools, publicly-subsidised 
private schools, bussing) usually base their arguments on the concepts of efficiency 
and equity. 
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From the perspective of efficiency, the potentialities of free choice are 
associated with the advantages which may emerge from the creation of quasi-markets 
in the education sector. Some authors argue that school choice will create competition 
among schools for student enrolment and lead to schools being more responsive to the 
needs and interest of parents and an improvement in school effectiveness, productivity 
and service, with the end result of a higher quality of education (Friedman and 
Friedman 1980; Chubb and Moe 1990; Levin 2002). 
From the perspective of equity, the attraction of school choice is based on its 
potentialities as a way of equalising the opportunities to choose schools for all 
individuals and on its effects upon the reduction of social inequalities in the 
distribution of pupils among different schools. Moreover, supporters of these policies 
claim that their principal beneficiaries are precisely the most economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups, who, in the absence of measures of this type would 
lack the necessary resources to exercise freedom of choice. 
In opposition to this argumentation in favour of freedom of choice, various 
authors have, over the last decade, demonstrated the difficulties of giving practical 
effect to the above-mentioned advantages and the strong probability that the 
consequences of these measures are counterproductive, especially as regards equity 
(Glennerster, 1991; Echols and Willms, 1995; Levin, 1998; Lankford and Wycokff, 
2001; among others). This is due to the fact that the realisation of the potential 
advantages cited by the supporters of school choice requires the existence of certain 
conditions which are highly unlikely to occur in the education market. The alleged 
improvement in quality through increased competition, for example, requires that 
users have adequate information about the various options open to them. In order to 
enjoy the benefits of freedom of choice, all families must be able to exercise their 
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right to choose under identical conditions. The complex nature of educational 
institutions and the production process undertaken within them raises doubts as to 
whether these requirements are fulfilled. 
In fact, despite almost forty years of research on the subject, our understanding 
of the factors which determine what makes a "quality" school is still limited 
(Hanushek, 1986 and 2003). Schools continue to be a mystery, even for the 
researchers examining them and, particularly, for their users, thereby making the 
definition of the concept of school quality extremely complicated. In a context of this 
nature, the best way to assess how well a school functions is by establishing direct 
contact with it. However, “trying out the product” in the educational sphere involves 
serious personal costs, given the problems of adaptation which changing schools 
usually involves. This is what Glennerster (1991) terms the "sunk costs" associated 
with the choice of a school.  
The situation described above has two principal consequences. Firstly, 
individuals who must choose between different schooling alternatives necessarily do 
so on the basis of high visibility variables, such as the religious leanings of the school, 
its facilities and extra-curricular activities, the type of pupils attending it, proximity to 
the home, etc. All of these factors are non-academic and their relationship to the 
quality of the actual education provided is not clearly demonstrated. Various 
empirical studies of the factors taken into account by families when selecting a school 
(Echols, McPherson, and Willms 1990; Willms and Echols 1992; Lankford and 
Wyckoff 1992, Denessen 2005) confirm this hypothesis and, furthermore, 
demonstrate that one of the elements most highly rated by families is the overall 
socioeconomic profile of the centre's pupils. In a context such as that described above, 
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competition to attract pupils does not necessarily lead to greater academic quality of 
schools, since this is not a variable easily perceived by clients3. 
Secondly, it must be remembered that the high costs of obtaining information 
about schools particularly affects families with relatively low socioeconomic and/or 
educational levels and, thus, it is very likely that these are excluded from the choosing 
process4. A number of empirical studies support this statement (Archbald 1988; 
Moore and Davenport 1990; Willms and Echols 1992; Ambler 1994; Echols and 
Willms 1995; Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1996; Martínez, Godwin, and Keremer 1996; 
Witte and Thorn 1996; Vandenberghe 1996; Lankford and Wyckoff 2001; Bosetti 
2004, among others). All of these have demonstrated that in educational systems 
which have implemented measures to increase freedom of choice, the "choosers" have 
been economically better-off families, while the relatively disadvantaged have tended 
to keep their children in the educational centre allocated to them.  
Thus, the foreseeable effect of freedom of choice policies upon the behaviour 
of the users of the educational system may be the following: "good" pupils will 
transfer to the centres with the best reputation and the most select pupils, while "bad" 
pupils will remain grouped together in their allocated centres, producing "cream 
skimming" in the education market, as various empirical studies show (Walford 1992; 
Whitty 1997; Cobb and Glass 1999; Figlio and Stone 2001; Dee and Fu 2004; among 
others). This tendency is reinforced by the non-neutrality of schools with regard to the 
characteristics of their pupils and they have significant incentives to select students 
from good family backgrounds (see Nechyba 1996)5. 
In conclusion, there exist strong arguments, supported by the limited empirical 
evidence available, which seriously question the capacity of policies aimed at 
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increasing freedom of choice to improve the efficiency and equity of educational 
systems.  Our study is conceived as a further contribution to this ongoing debate. 
3. The socioeconomic and academic distribution of pupils between public and 
publicly-subsidised private secondary schools in the Spanish Autonomous 
Community of Aragon  
 
This section analyses the results of a questionnaire answered by the 5,909 students 
who were in the final year of secondary school in 2005 in the Spanish Autonomous 
Community of Aragon. 4,030 of those polled attended public schools (hereafter PS) 
and 1,879 attended publicly-subsidised private schools (hereafter PSPS). The 
questionnaire provides data for the three following fields: the academic quality of the 
pupils (previous marks, educational aspirations, time spent on homework, self-
confidence); pupils’ perceptions of family academic expectations (parents' academic 
aspirations and their confidence in good academic results in the future); and, finally, 
family socioeconomic background (educational level, parents' occupation and family 
income)6. The qualitative nature of the data suggests using crosstabs and Pearson's 
chi-square test (Hair et al. 1998)7. 
Firstly, we shall analyse the differences in the variables which represent the 
academic potential of pupils. Table 1 presents the relevant results. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The contents of the table and the value of the chi-square test permit us to deduce that 
the academic record of PS and PSPS secondary schools is significantly different, in 
favour of the latter. In the total sample, the percentage of pupils who are repeating the 
year is far higher in PS (11.6%) than in PSPS (5.6%). Similarly, the latter have far 
more pupils who passed all subjects in the previous academic year and who obtained 
good marks. 
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Similar results are obtained for the variables ASPIRATIONS (intention to go 
to university) and SELF-CONFIDENCE (perception of his/her own ability to obtain a 
university degree)8. While approximately 54% of pupils in PSPS want to go to 
university, only 40% of public school students do. Publicly-subsidised private school 
students are also more self-confident; 38% of all the interviewees in this sector see 
themselves as capable of obtaining a good degree at university, compared to 30% of 
public school students. 
Students at PSPS also have a better perception of family academic support. As 
the results in Table 1 show, over 80% of the pupils surveyed in these centres consider 
that their parents wish them to attend university, compared to 75% in the case of 
public school students.  
Moreover, the perception which pupils have regarding the degree of 
confidence of their parents that they will obtain a good university degree (another 
aspect of family academic support) is better in PSPS. Forty-two percent of the 
students interviewed in these centres reply that their parents are certain that they will 
achieve good marks at university, while this percentage falls to 34.4% in the case of 
public school students.  
Having observed the distribution of pupils' academic qualities, we shall now 
examine the situation with regard to the family socioeconomic profile of students at 
each type of centre. To this end, we analyse the survey questions regarding parents' 
educational level, family income level and parents' occupation. Table 2 presents the 
results of the comparison. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
With regard to parents' educational level, it should be noted that while, in PSPS, the 
distribution of the educational level of the father is fairly homogeneous (compulsory 
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schooling, post-compulsory schooling and university each representing approximately 
33%), in PS, the distribution is biased towards compulsory schooling (48%, compared 
to 19.2% who completed higher education). The educational level of the mother also 
varies greatly according to the type of centre: the percentage of mothers with post-
compulsory schooling or higher education is higher in PSPS, while the percentage of 
mothers with only compulsory schooling is higher in PS.  
With regard to the variables most closely related to the economic aspects of 
the family environment, the income level and the profession of the parents, PSPS have 
a higher percentage of students (47.2%) whose monthly family income exceeds 
€1,800 than PS (35.2%). In the average income range, the percentages are more 
similar and, in the case of monthly family incomes under €1,200, the percentage of 
students is higher in PS (16.8%) than in PSPS (9.8%).  
Turning to parents' profession, the analysis of Table 2 leads to similar 
conclusions. Far more students in PSPS have fathers with skilled jobs (62.6%, 
compared to 37.4% of unskilled workers), while the opposite is the case in PS (56.8% 
of fathers are unskilled and 43.2% skilled). In the case of the mother's employment, 
and as was to be expected, because of the more limited access of women to the labour 
market, unskilled work is the most common in both types of centre. Nevertheless, 
there remain significant differences in favour of PSPS. 
In conclusion, the analysis performed demonstrates the existence of processes 
of academic and socioeconomic segregation in the Spanish educational system which 
favour PSPS. Pupils of PSPS have a better prior academic record, greater academic 
aspirations (both individual and family), higher self-confidence and a stronger 
perception of the degree of confidence that their parents have about their future 
academic success. Moreover, these schools have a higher proportion of students 
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whose parents are qualified workers, have completed higher education and have a 
monthly income exceeding 1,800 euros. Similarly, when comparing the values of 
Tables 1 and 2, it can be observed that the differences between the students in public 
and publicly-subsidised centres are even greater for the variables related to family 
characteristics than for the academic profile of the student. These results are similar to 
those obtained by other research (Jimenez, Lockheed, and Paqueo 1991; Williams and 
Carpenter 1991; Witte 1992; Figlio and Stone 1997; Levin 1998; Cobb and Glass 
1999; Lankford and Wyckoff 2001; Dee and Fu 2004; among others). The low p-
value obtained in all the cases analysed indicates, furthermore, that the variables 
analysed and the type of centre have some interdependence.  
4. An approximation to the degree of segregation within the public and publicly-
subsidised education sectors 
 
The analysis performed in the previous section permits us to affirm that processes of 
academic and socioeconomic segregation exist in the Spanish educational system and 
that these favour publicly-subsidised private schools. However, a complete diagnosis 
of the stratification in the school system requires an analysis of how the public and 
publicly-subsidised private education sectors compare with regard to the segregation 
occurring among the different schools within each sector. This question is important, 
as the social and educational repercussions derived from widespread segregation 
within a sector are the same, independently of the proportion of disadvantaged pupils 
in that sector (Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982). In other words, the fact that 
students in the public sector have a worse socioeconomic background than their 
publicly-subsidised private sector counterparts does not guarantee that the former 
produces greater integration than the latter. 
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Before describing the tools employed in the analysis and the results obtained, 
we would like to clarify that, when speaking of internal segregation, we are referring 
to the variation in the distribution of different types of students among schools within 
the same education sector, whether public or publicly-subsidised private. This concept 
of segregation does not concern the relative proportions of pupil types within the 
sector but, instead, concentrates on the relative distributions of pupil types among the 
schools in that sector (Taeuber and James 1982). On this basis, the quantification of 
the degree of intra-sector segregation has usually been performed using diverse 
indices. In the educational context, the most common of these have been those termed 
the dissimilarity index and the segregation index (Zoloth 1976). The first of these is 
based on the analysis of the deviations which exist between the composition of the 
student body in each school and that of the sector taken as a whole. It can be 
interpreted as the fraction of the minority group that would need to be relocated in 
different schools in order to obtain the same social composition across all schools. 
Its mathematical expression is as follows: 
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where kiT  and kip  are, respectively, the total number and the proportion of 
students from group i  in school k, p  is the percentage of students from that group in 
the sector and T   is the total number of pupils from that group in the sector. Their 
values range from 0 (absence of segregation) to 1 (maximum segregation). 
The segregation index, in turn, is based on a measurement of the contact which 
exists within each school between students from the various groups i.e. the average 
proportion of a student’s schoolmates who are from another group (Coleman, Hoffer, 
and Kilgore 1982). Mathematically, this contact index is defined by the following 
expression: 
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where kin  represents the number of pupils from group i in school k and kjp  the 
percentage of pupils from group j in school k. 
The segregation index is constructed by standardising the measure of contact 
by the proportion of students of the other group in the sector. Thus, it reflects only the 
distribution of pupils among the schools in the sector, given their overall numbers. 
The values of this internal segregation index range from 0 (absence of segregation) to 
1 (maximum segregation), and its mathematical expression is the following9:  
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where jp  is the proportion of pupils from group j in the sector. 
The results of the application of these indices to the sample of schools 
belonging to the Spanish region of Aragon are presented in Table 3. As can be 
observed, the level of segregation among pupils of different socioeconomic levels, 
although generally low, is slightly greater in publicly-subsidised private schools, in all 
the dimensions of the analysis performed. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
This result shows that the distribution of pupils from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds is more homogeneous in the public than in the publicly-subsidised 
private sector. In the latter, as we saw in the previous section, there is a greater 
concentration of the pupils with better socioeconomic backgrounds, compared to the 
public sector, but their distribution among schools is more heterogeneous. Thus, 
socioeconomic stratification is greater in the publicly-subsidised private sector. One 
possible explanation of this behaviour may be that families from the various 
socioeconomic strata have different propensities to choose. The more highly-qualified 
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and economically better-off clients of the private sector are more active participants in 
the school marketplace than their public school counterparts (Goldring and Phillips 
2008)10. Another explanation may be an undisclosed policy of risk selection on the 
part of some PSPS (Glennerster 1991). This means that some subsidised private 
schools may be using various mechanisms to prevent certain students (mainly 
immigrants and potentially low achievers) from enrolling, like charging for uniforms, 
extracurricular activities, catering and parents associations. 
5. Analysis of the determinants of school choice  
 
The analysis undertaken in Section 3 has enabled us to detect the existence of a 
relationship of dependence between the type of pupil and the type of educational 
centre. From the starting point of this result, this section attempts to empirically test 
this relationship and to analyse it in greater depth. The specific objective of this 
section is to study which factors may explain enrolment in each type of school. 
5.1. Specification of the model 
 
The qualitative and discrete nature of the dependent variable (type of school) explains 
why we employ a regression model for a discrete dependent variable. From among the 
alternatives available, we chose to apply a probit model11. 
These models are intended to estimate the probability that a student i attends a 
PSPS ( iP =1), against the alternative of a PS ( iP =0). In our case, this probability will 
be analysed on the basis of a set of socioeconomic variables ( iS ), of the reasons for 
school choice given by students ( iR ) and of other characteristics of the pupils in the 
centres analysed ( iO )
12. 
Given the nature of the problem we intend to resolve here, we have excluded 
from the analysis those students who attend schools located in municipalities in which 
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there is no educational alternative to the type of school (PS or PSPS) in which they 
are enrolled (since, in this case, there is no possibility of choice). The sample size is 
thereby reduced to slightly under 4,000 cases, from the 5,900 individuals in the initial 
sample.  
In order to proxy the socioeconomic level of the student's family ( iS ), we 
have information regarding the family economy (FAMILY INCOME), educational 
level (FATHER’S EDUCATION and MOTHER’S EDUCATION) and parents' 
employment category (FATHER’S JOB and MOTHER’S JOB). Employing this set of 
variables could introduce problems of multicollinearity since some correlation exists 
between many of them. To overcome this problem, we chose to synthesise the 
information by utilising a statistical technique of data reduction. However, the model 
including separate variables has also been estimated to provide greater insight into the 
specific mechanisms of selection.  
To summarise the information regarding family socioeconomic status, we used 
the Homogeneity Analysis by Means of Alternating Least Squares (HOMALS) 
procedure, which estimates category quantifications, object scores, and other 
associated statistics that separate categories (levels) of nominal variables as far as 
possible and divides cases into homogeneous subgroups (Gifi 1990). All items of the 
variables were inverted for scaling so that positive scores indicate higher levels of 
socioeconomic status. The application of this methodology to the variables contained 
in Table 2 produced a single dimension, which we term socioeconomic indicator 
(SES) and which explains 52.73% of the information about family socioeconomic 
background. The SES index ranges from a minimum of -1.59 to a maximum of 2.41 
with a mean of 0.13. This indicator constitutes the variable to be incorporated into the 
probit model as an approximation of the socioeconomic variables ( iS ). Table 4 
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presents the measurements of discrimination which permit us to determine to what 
extent each variable is explained by the indicator. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we include in the model other variables which we consider may be relevant in 
the choice of school and which have usually been included in other empirical studies. 
Specifically, these are the variables GENDER and CHOICE REASON (see 
Appendix)13.  
5.2. Results 
 
Two probit models have been estimated. Model I employs the SES indicator as 
explanatory variable whereas model II considers the separate variables that formed 
that index. In terms of overall percent correctly predicted and pseudo R-squared, the 
models do equally well and indicate a considerable goodness of fit. Before 
interpreting the coefficients of the models, we can briefly look at the predicted 
probabilities for some values of the socioeconomic variables. In model I, the predicted 
probability of attending a PSPS is 0.39 if the SES index is -1.58 (its minimum) and 
increases to 0.57 if the SES indicator reaches its maximum of 2.41. Families with low 
income in model II have a probability of attending a PSPS of 0.39, while families with 
medium or high income have a probability of 0.48.  
Estimated coefficients from probit models are not directly interpretable 
because they are parameters of the latent model. They do not quantify the influence of 
explanatory variables on the probability that the dependent variable takes the value of 
one. It is necessary to estimate the marginal effects, defined as the effect of a one-unit 
change of an explanatory variable on the probability of the dependent, all other 
variables being constant. The marginal effect depends on the value of the explanatory 
variable. Therefore, there is an individual marginal effect for each person of the 
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sample. Two different methods of estimating marginal effects exist. One method is 
the computation of the average of discrete or partial changes over all observations, 
yielding average marginal effects. The other method is the computation of marginal 
effects at fixed values of the independent variables. The most often used values are 
sample means. This method yields marginal effects at the mean. In the literature, there 
is not much discussion about which of these two methods should be used, and the 
discussion does not seem to be conclusive. Table 5 displays both types of marginal 
effects. Results are quite similar but average marginal effects are slightly lower than 
marginal effects evaluated at the mean. This table also exhibits the minimum and 
maximum individual marginal effects, in which some variables show considerable 
variation in their individual marginal effects. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
All variables in model I are highly significant and the signs are the expected ones. 
Results of model II confirm the previous ones obtained with the SES index. Most of 
the variables in model II are also significant, except father and mother with 
compulsory schooling and family with high income. The variable mother with 
university degree is the only one that presents the opposite sign to that expected. 
For the interpretation of the models, we use the marginal effects estimated at 
the mean. As can be observed in Table 5, an infinitesimal increase in the 
socioeconomic status (SES) produces an increase of 4.7% in the probability of 
attending a publicly-subsidised private school, everything else being constant. 
Similarly, in model II, the probability of a student being enrolled in a PSPS is about 
4.5% higher if he/she has a father/mother with a qualified job than if not. Belonging to 
a family with low income decreases the probability of attending a publicly-subsidised 
private school by 9%. As has been previously mentioned, there is no linear relation in 
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a probit model, so the marginal effects are not constant. Given the argument of the 
paper and the fact that equality involves what is happening at the extremes of the SES 
variable rather than at the means, it is important to analyse the marginal effects at 
these extreme values. Therefore, we have estimated the marginal effects of the 
socioeconomic status (SES) at its extreme values (minimum and maximum). If the 
SES of the student with the lowest socioeconomic background goes up by an 
infinitesimal amount, the probability of attending a PSPS rises by 4.4%. On the other 
hand, the same increase for the student with the highest socioeconomic background 
raises the likelihood of enrolling in a PSPS by 3.3%. These results suggest that there 
is no equalisation of opportunities to access publicly-subsidised private schools or that 
these opportunities are considerably reduced for poorer families. This confirms the 
results obtained in previous studies of the subject (Lankford and Wyckoff 1992; 
Kingdon 1996; Figlio and Stone 2001). 
It is also observable that, in both models, the probability of a pupil being 
enrolled in a PSPS (instead of a PS) is positively related to his/her family choosing 
such a centre for reasons of prestige or family tradition, but negatively related to 
choice based on geographical proximity. Lastly, and following the pattern of other 
studies, the variable of gender was introduced. The results show that male pupils are 
more likely to attend a PSPS, as other research has also demonstrated. 
6.  Conclusions and final considerations 
 
The analysis performed in the previous sections casts grave doubts on the capacity of 
Spanish PSPS to equalise the opportunities of school choice for all families. The 
distribution of pupils between the public and publicly-subsidised sectors continues to 
follow a clear socioeconomic pattern which favours privately-owned schools, the 
majority of whose pupils' families belong to the upper-income strata and are 
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employed in professions which require more advanced qualifications and a higher 
level of education. Accordingly, these pupils show better attitudes towards learning 
(greater academic ambition and more self-confidence) and appreciate greater 
academic support from their families. By contrast, public schools have a greater 
proportion of pupils from families with worse socioeconomic backgrounds. These 
results confirm, therefore, the existence of processes of cream skimming in the 
Spanish education market, a phenomenon which has also been detected by various 
studies which have analysed the British and American education systems. Our study 
offers an additional result, namely, that cream skimming processes are more recurrent 
within the publicly-subsidised sector, which is shown to be far more selective than the 
public sector in its distribution of pupils. 
The explanation for this “failure” of Spanish publicly-subsidised private 
schools to equalise opportunities for school choice is rooted, in our judgement, in the 
lack of instruments that the Spanish education system has to give practical effect to 
the free choice of schools which the Spanish PSPS are intended to guarantee. In fact, 
apart from the formal regulations contained in the 1985 Right to Education Act 
(LODE) and statutes which govern the admission criteria of educational centres which 
receive public funding, there are absolutely no measures aimed at facilitating the 
choice of a school located outside the residential area of the pupil. Moreover, the very 
regulations stemming from the LODE hinder rather than help mobility between 
schools. Proximity continues to be the most important criterion for the selection of 
pupils in publicly-financed educational centres, which limits the possibilities of 
choosing a school a long way from the family home and helps to maintain the patterns 
of social stratification associated with residential zone. 
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Furthermore, the capacity of the Spanish educational system to provide 
freedom of school choice is severely restricted by the lack of data about the quality of 
the centres. In this respect, the generalised absence of information about the academic 
results obtained in each school is particularly important. In addition, the education 
legislation currently in force permits Spanish PSPS to charge fees for out-of-school 
activities and for educational material, which reduces the possibility to choosing for 
less well-off users, for whom the uniforms that pupils are required to wear by Spanish 
PSPS represents an additional economic barrier. 
In conclusion, the significant information and economic inequalities faced by 
families of different income levels when putting their right to school choice into 
practice requires the regulations protecting that right to be accompanied by positive 
discrimination measures in favour of the least well-off families. By these, we mean 
measures such as the diffusion of information among the most disadvantaged groups 
about the right to choose, the provision of information about the teaching practices 
and academic results of the centres available in each municipality, the financing of the 
costs derived from attendance at a school a long way from the family home for pupils 
from low-income households, and the reduction of the importance of area of residence 
in the allocation of school places. It is only by measures of this type that it will be 
possible to limit the extension of the processes of cream skimming in the education 
markets and the consequences that these processes have in the field of equity. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 According to data provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education, the distribution of students enrolled 
in secondary education in 2005 was: 66.33% in public schools, 30.48% in publicly-subsidised private 
schools and a residual 3.19% in purely private schools. For a detailed description of the Spanish non- 
university educational system, and of its historical evolution, see Bernal (2005).  
2 The obligations of schools include the following: to provide free teaching at the educational level 
agreed, to request authorisation for the charging of any fees for complementary activities, to maintain a 
specific pupil/teacher ratio and to apply the same admission criteria as public schools. In turn, the 
Administration undertakes to finance the activity of the school through a system of economic modules 
per educational establishment, as established in the General State Budget.  
3 The results of the empirical studies in this field are varied. While Bast and Walberg (2004) summarize 
various studies which demonstrate beneficial effects of school choice policies upon academic results, 
others, such as that of Bettinger (2005), do not reveal any significant effect upon academic success. 
4 As Levin (1991) explains, both the access to information and its efficient use require a certain 
experience in the making of choices, in addition to a certain educational level which permits rational 
decisions to be made. 
5 The empirical evidence is not, however, conclusive with regard to the selection procedures of schools. 
Some studies, such as that of Bryk, Lee, and Holland (1993), demonstrate that private Catholic schools 
are not selective about admissions, while others, like that by Vandenberghe (1996), show that the 
opposite is true. 
6 The Appendix summarises the variables defined on the basis of the items in the questionnaire. 
7 There exist other statistics that measure the "degree of association" between two nominal variables 
such as Phi, Cramer’s V and the contingency coefficient. These measures confirm that there is a 
significant association between the variables studied. Results are available upon request. 
8 The self-confidence measure is actually a mixture of self-confidence and a self-assessment of personal 
preparedness. For simplicity we refer to it only as self-confidence. 
9 Standardisation is carried out because of the sensitivity of the contact index cij to the total proportion 
of students from group j in the sector. 
10 In Bernal (2005), three types of electors are identified in the educational market of the city of 
Zaragoza (Spain): non-electors, moderate electors and demanding electors. Most of the first group 
belong to the working class and do not choose schools, but send their children to the nearest public 
school. Most of the moderate electors belong to the middle class and enrol their in children to 
subsidised private schools. Demanding electors send their children to both private and subsidised 
schools and belong to the upper and middle classes.  
11 The estimations we performed using logit models produced very similar results, which are available 
to any reader requiring them. 
12 The selection of the variables to be incorporated into the model is based on several earlier studies of 
the subject (Kingdon 1996; Bedi and Garg 2000; Figlio and Stone 2001; Lankford and Wyckoff 2001; 
Epple, Figlio, and Romano 2004) 
13 The variables measuring academic achievement reflect the experiences of students in public or 
private schools as well as factors that may have contributed to the initial choices of school type by their 
parents. Thus, we do not consider previous academic achievement as an explanatory variable in the 
probit model because mixed effects are difficult to separate. 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
 
Variable name Description Values 
GENDER Gender Male / Female 
AGE Age 17-18 years old / Over 18 years old 
PREVIOUS YEAR 
PERFORMANCE Marks in previous year  I passed all subjects / I must retake subjects / I am repeating the year 
PREVIOUS YEAR MARK Mark 1st year A-level A-B / C-D-E / I am retaking subjects 
ASPIRATIONS Do you wish to obtain a university qualification? Yes, degree / Yes, foundation degree / No 
SELF-CONFIDENCE Do you think you are capable of obtaining a good university degree/qualification? Yes / It will be difficult but I will make a greater effort / Only able to pass / No 
PARENTS' ASPIRATIONS Do your parents wish you to obtain a university degree/qualification? Yes / No / Don't know 
PARENTS' CONFIDENCE How confident do you think your parents are that you will obtain a good university degree/qualification? Completely sure / Difficult but possible / If I pass they would be satisfied  
TEACHERS' CONFIDENCE What do you think your teachers expect of you? A brilliant future / A future in accordance with the average of the other pupils / A difficult future because I don't try hard enough 
ATTENDANCE Class attendance When I can / Usually / Always 
HOMEWORK TIME Weekly study time Less than 5 hours / Between 5 and 10 hours / Between 10 and 15 hours / More than 15 hours 
FATHER'S EDUCATION Father's education Compulsory schooling / Post compulsory schooling / University 
MOTHER'S EDUCATION Mother's education Compulsory schooling / Post compulsory schooling / University 
FAMILY INCOME Family income < €1200 /month / €1200 - 1800 / > 1800 € 
FATHER'S JOB Father's profession White collar / Blue collar 
MOTHER'S JOB Mother's profession White collar / Blue collar 
STAY LENGTH How long have you attended this school? 1 year / Between 2 and 5 years / More than 5 years 
SATISFACTION Would you recommend this school to others? Yes / No 
CHOICE REASON Why do you attend this school? Only school in my municipality or locality / Closest school to my house / Family tradition / The school is prestigious / Other reasons  
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Table 1. Crosstab of academic and personal variables   
Survey variable  Survey question Reply options Public schools 
Publicly-
subsidised schools Total 
PREVIOUS YEAR 
PERFORMANCEa 
Previous year's academic 
performance 
I passed all subjects 61.3% 73.4% 65.2% 
I must retake some subjects 27.0% 20.9% 25.1% 
I am repeating the year 11.6% 5.6% 9.7% 
PREVIOUS YEAR 
MARKb Mark 1st year A-level 
A-B 34.2% 38.1% 35.4% 
C-D-E 41.7% 43.7% 42.3% 
I am retaking subjects 24.1% 18.3% 22.2% 
ASPIRATIONSc Do you wish to obtain a university qualification? 
Yes, a degree 40.5% 54.0% 44.8% 
Yes, a foundation degree 36.0% 28.5% 33.6% 
No 23.5% 17.5% 21.6% 
SELF-CONFIDENCEd 
Do you think you are capable of 
obtaining a good university 
degree? 
Yes 30.9% 37.8% 33.1% 
It will be difficult but I will make a greater effort 41.5% 41.3% 41.4% 
Only able to pass 18.1% 13.6% 16.6% 
No 9.6% 7.3% 8.8% 
PARENTS' 
ASPIRATIONSe 
Do your parents wish you to obtain 
a university degree? 
Yes 75.3% 81.3% 72.2% 
No 2.4% 1.7% 2.1% 
Don't know 22.3% 17.1% 20.6% 
PARENTS' 
CONFIDENCEf 
How confident do you think your 
parents are that you will obtain a 
good university degree? 
Completely sure 34.4% 42.8% 37.1% 
Difficult but possible 26.1% 25.3% 25.9% 
If I pass they would be satisfied 39.5% 31.8% 37.1% 
aChi-square test= 93.827 (p-value = 0.000) 
bChi-square test= 25.817 (p-value = 0.000) 
cChi-square test= 173.99 (p-value = 0.000) 
dChi-square test= 41.699 (p-value = 0.000) 
eChi-square test= 26.042 (p-value = 0.000) 
fChi-square test= 44.782 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Crosstab socioeconomic variables  
Survey question Reply options Public schools Publicly-subsidised schools Total 
FATHER'S 
EDUCATIONa 
Compulsory schooling 48.0% 33.5% 43.4% 
Post-compulsory schooling 32.8% 33.5% 33.0% 
University  19.2% 33.0% 23.5% 
MOTHER'S 
EDUCATIONb 
Compulsory schooling 55.7% 43.2% 51.7% 
Post-compulsory schooling 27.3% 31.8% 28.7% 
University 17.0% 25.1% 19.6% 
FAMILY INCOMEc 
Under 1,200 euros 16.8% 9.8% 14.5% 
Between 1,200 and 1,800 euros 48.0% 43.0% 46.4% 
Over 1,800 euros 35.2% 47.2% 39.1% 
FATHER'S JOBd Blue collar 56.8% 37.4% 50.6% White collar 43.2% 62.6% 49.4% 
MOTHER'S JOBe Blue collar 77.8% 66.8% 74.3% White collar 22.2% 33.2% 25.7% 
aChi-square test= 163.464 (p-value = 0.000) 
bChi-square test= 89.450 (p-value = 0.000) 
cChi-square test= 93.916 (p-value = 0.000) 
dChi-square test= 189.606 (p-value = 0.000) 
eChi-square test= 79.381 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Social class segregation indices 
Category Segregation Indices Public schools Publicly-subsidised schools 
FAMILY INCOMEa Dissimilarity index (D) 0.18 0.25 Segregation index (S) 0.05 0.18 
FATHER'S JOBb Dissimilarity index (D) 0.24 0.32 Segregation index (S) 0.08 0.12 
MOTHER'S JOBb Dissimilarity index (D) 0.24 0.27 Segregation index (S) 0.06 0.10 
FATHER'S EDUCATIONc Dissimilarity index (D) 0.22 0.28 Segregation index (S) 0.15 0.19 
MOTHER'S EDUCATIONc Dissimilarity index (D) 0.22 0.28 Segregation index (S) 0.13 0.18 
aThe disadvantaged group is considered to comprise those pupils whose monthly family income is below €1,200, while the 
most advantaged group is comprised of pupils whose monthly family income exceeds €1,800. 
bThe disadvantaged group is considered to comprise those students whose parents are in unskilled employment. 
cThe disadvantaged group is considered to comprise those students whose parents completed compulsory schooling, while 
the most advantaged group is comprised of pupils whose parents completed higher education. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: HOMALS discrimination measures
  SES 
FATHER'S JOB  0.525 
MOTHER'S JOB  0.531 
FATHER'S EDUCATION  0.588 
MOTHER'S EDUCATION  0.615 
FAMILY INCOME  0.378 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Probit models. 
Variable 
Model I Model II 
Coef. Marg. effects at means 
Avg. Marg. effects Coef. Marg. effects at means 
Avg. Marg. effects 
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Qualified father's job 0.115** 0.046 0.040 0.023 0.046 
(0.055) 
Qualified mother's job 0.112* 0.045 0.039 0.023 0.045 
(0.062) 
Compulsory schooling father -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
(0.055) 
University degree father 0.110* 0.044 0.038 0.022 0.044 
(0.063) 
Compulsory schooling mother -0.081 -0.032 -0.028 -0.032 -0.016 
(0.054) 
University degree mother -0.145** -0.058 -0.050 -0.058 -0.030 
(0.073) 
Low family income -0.229*** -0.091 -0.077 -0.091 -0.057 
(0.070) 
High family income 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 
(0.051) 
SES (Socioeconomic Index) 0.119*** 0.047 0.041 0.025 0.048 
(0.021) 
School choice (Prestige) 0.714*** 0.284 0.267 0.238 0.279 0.698*** 0.278 0.258 0.223 0.273 
(0.059) (0.062) 
School choice (Tradition) 0.902*** 0.358 0.322 0.283 0.346 0.911*** 0.362 0.321 0.269 0.351 
(0.086) (0.090) 
School choice (Proximity) -0.536*** -0.213 -0.193 -0.211 -0.176 -0.541** -0.215 -0.196 -0.213 -0.154 
(0.049) (0.051) 
Gender (Male) 0.140*** 0.056 0.048 0.032 0.056 0.131*** 0.052 0.045 0.027 0.052 
(0.042) (0.044) 
Constant -0.191*** -0.174** 
    (0.038)          (0.069)         
Number of observations 3974 3665 
Percent correctly predicted 67.51% 67,83% 
Log-likelihood value -2398.71 -2204.73 
Pseudo R-squared   0.126          0.130         
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
